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Introduction
Since the Modern Slavery Act (England and Wales), the Human 
Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for 
Victims) Act (Northern Ireland), and the Human Trafficking and 
Exploitation (Scotland) Act all entered into force in the UK in 
2015, there have been more systematic attempts to identify 
and measure incidences of modern slavery. According to the 
2017 Annual Report on Modern Slavery (Home Office, 2017), 
between 2014 and 2017 a total of 9 410 potential cases of 
modern slavery were identified through the National Referral 
Mechanism (NRM), of which 3 552 (38%) were identified 
primarily as victims of labour exploitation. In addition, between 
November 2015 and June 2017, a further 1 621 potential cases 
of modern slavery were identified through the legal “duty to 
notify” under the Act, of which 515 (32%) were identified 
primarily as victims of labour exploitation.1 
A striking feature of the official statistics on modern slavery 
is the high proportion of cases among those not born in the 
UK. According to the NRM data, in 2016 the vast majority of 
potential cases concerned migrants from 108 countries (only 
8.9% concerned people of UK origin). Similarly, the “duty 
to notify” data indicate that only 3% concerned people of 
UK origin, while 46% of cases came from EEA countries and 
50% from non-EEA countries.2 Finally, in terms of decisions in 
relation to these potential cases of modern slavery, the annual 
report indicates that, of the 3 804 cases dealt with under NRM 
by June 2017, 907 (24%) had received a positive reasonable 
grounds decision followed by a positive conclusive grounds 
decision (and thus were confirmed cases), while a further 1 491 
(39%) had received a positive reasonable grounds decision and 
were awaiting a conclusive grounds decision. Therefore, even 
if all the unresolved cases were to be determined as modern 
slavery cases, less than two thirds (63%) of those referred 
under NRM would be classified as actual cases of modern 
slavery.
This brief overview of the data highlights four important 
issues about modern slavery in the UK, and beyond. In the 
first instance, the discrepancy between the potential and 
determined cases of modern slavery raises questions about 
how modern slavery should be defined and what distinguishes 
it from other exploitative forms of labour utilisation. This relates 
to a second issue, recognised in the annual report and reflected 
by the increased reporting of potential cases over time, namely 
the extent to which forms of modern slavery can be detected, 
and the extent to which this remains a hidden, and thus 
underestimated, phenomenon. Thirdly, the data indicate that 
the majority of those individuals potentially subject to modern 
slavery are migrants to the UK, which raises the wider question 
as to how forms of modern slavery are linked to migration 
and the wider process of economic globalisation. A final issue, 
raised through its omission from the reporting of modern 
slavery in the UK, is the extent to which cases are associated 
with specific industrial sectors, and whether sectors such as 
hospitality are more likely to be associated with the conditions 
that allow modern slavery to develop and “thrive”.
This paper tries to address these four issues, arguing that 
an understanding of modern slavery has to be rooted in the 
current process of neo-liberal globalisation and the increasing 
utilisation of migrant workers to achieve flexibility and labour 
cost savings. In the first section of the paper, the concept 
of modern slavery is outlined, and the difficult distinctions 
between modern slavery and increasingly exploitative working 
conditions are explored. The main section of the paper then 
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looks at how the process of economic globalisation has placed 
the pursuit of profit and the reduction of total labour costs as 
the focus of the management of labour and how this has been 
reflected in increased casualisation and precarious employment 
in the UK, as well as the utilisation of migrant workers. The 
subsequent section then considers the UK hospitality sector 
and outlines the reasons why, based upon its structure and 
labour-intensive nature, it is a sector where the conditions for 
labour exploitation and modern slavery exist. The final section 
then places this within the context of Brexit, where a possible 
future scenario is outlined, in which modern slavery will reflect 
the political economy of the UK.
The complexity of modern slavery 
The complexity of defining modern slavery precisely is apparent 
from examining the 2015 Modern Slavery Act. While the 
coverage of the Act does include domestic servitude, sexual 
exploitation, and the removal of organs, the focus here will be 
that of labour exploitation. In this area, Section 1 of the Act 
refers to the Human Rights Convention and states:
A person commits an offence if:
(a) the person holds another person in slavery or 
servitude and the circumstances are such that the 
person knows or ought to know that the other person 
is held in slavery or servitude; or 
(b) the person requires another person to perform 
forced or compulsory labour and the circumstances are 
such that the person knows or ought to know that the 
other person is being required to perform forced or 
compulsory labour.
In determining whether a person is being held in slavery or 
servitude or required to perform forced or compulsory labour, 
regard may be had to all the circumstances. 
For example, regard may be had— 
(a) to any of the person’s personal circumstances 
(such as the person being a child, the person’s family 
relationships, and any mental or physical illness) which 
may make the person more vulnerable than other 
persons; 
(b) to any work or services provided by the person, 
including work or services provided in circumstances 
which constitute exploitation.
At this early point of the Act’s definition of slavery, there is 
already scope for subjective interpretation of whether a 
“person knows”, over “personal circumstances” and crucially, 
“circumstances which constitute exploitation”. The issue of 
exploitation is subsequently addressed in Article 3 of the Act. Its 
interpretation is relatively clear when related to specific UK law 
in the areas of sexual exploitation (Protection of Children Act 
1978, and the Sexual Offences Act 2003), and organ removal 
(Human Tissue Act 2004). However, the definition in terms of 
labour exploitation is, at best, limited, if not tautological:
Slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour 
(2) The person is the victim of behaviour— 
(a) which involves the commission of an offence under 
section 1, or 
(b) which would involve the commission of an offence 
under that section if it took place in England and 
Wales.
A clearer understanding of labour exploitation in terms of 
modern slavery can, however, be found in the International 
Labour Organisation’s Forced Labour Convention (ILO, 1930), 
which simply states that forced or compulsory work is “all work 
or service which is exacted from any person under the threat of 
a penalty and for which the person has not offered himself or 
herself voluntarily”. This is further clarified in the ILO’s (2014) 
Forced Labour Protocol, which identifies three elements which 
underpin this definition:
Work or service refers to all types of work occurring in 
any activity, industry or sector including in the informal 
economy;
Menace of any penalty refers to a wide range of 
penalties used to compel someone to work; and
Involuntariness: The terms “offered voluntarily” refer 
to the free and informed consent of a worker to take 
a job and his or her freedom to leave at any time. This 
is not the case, for example, when an employer or 
recruiter makes false promises so that a worker takes 
a job he or she would not otherwise have accepted.
This approach does make the important technical distinction 
between exploitative conditions that may affect any form of 
work and exploitative labour which, due to its involuntary 
nature, should be classed as forced labour (and thus qualify as 
a form of modern slavery). Nevertheless, this distinction which 
is rooted in the notion of the free (capitalist) employment 
relationship can be a difficult line to draw, given the inequality 
between employer and worker in the employment relationship 
(Wedderburn, 1986, p. 142), the prerogative the contract gives 
to management (Selznick, 1969, p. 135), and the ultimate 
dependency of the worker upon employment to meet (at least) 
subsistence levels of income. In this respect, it should be noted 
that unemployed workers in the UK can be “forced” to work 
unpaid for up to four weeks or lose entitlement to out-of-work 
benefits, in a scheme running since 2011 and used by over 534 
companies in the first year, including many leading high street 
retailers and local councils (The Independent, 2016).
In this paper, it is argued that while this distinction 
is important legally, not least in terms of the 2015 Act, 
involuntary labour exploitation is closely related to exploitative 
working conditions and that organisational restructuring 
and the subsequent changes to the contractual status of 
workers, notably in the UK, have created the exploitative 
labour conditions from which forced labour can emerge. 
To understand this, it is necessary to examine the current 
process of neo-liberal globalisation and its approach to the 
management of labour, which focuses increasingly on the 
creation of “disposable people” (Bales, 2012).
Neo-liberal globalisation, migration and labour costs
In this section the development of globalisation, underpinned 
by a neo-liberal economic doctrine, is outlined to explain 
how a “race to the bottom” focused upon reducing labour 
costs has emerged and, following this, how the conditions 
for modern slavery are created. Most authors, such as Dicken 
(2011), trace the rise of globalisation to the 1980s, reflecting 
the key election victories of Ronald Reagan in the United 
States and Margaret Thatcher in the UK. Their governmental 
programmes, influenced by the economics of Hayek, 
Friedman and the Chicago Boys (Harvey, 2007), focused upon 
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dismantling Keynesian policies (notably the commitment to full 
employment) and drove forward the politics of privatisation, 
anti-unionism, labour market deregulation and, crucially, 
financial liberalisation. 
With the fall of the Soviet Union, as the only alternative 
system to capitalism, neo-liberal ideology gained international 
dominance in the 1990s, reflected in the Washington 
Consensus and actively pursued through the policies of the 
international financial institutions (IFIs) – the IMF, World Bank 
and WTO – urging structural reforms in emerging markets 
to accommodate capital flows (Martens & Mitter, 1994, 
p. 203). The liberalisation of finance to allow the movement of 
capital across borders was key to the growth of transnational 
corporations (TNCs) and their direct investment strategies. 
This liberalisation was promoted because it was argued that 
removing barriers to trade and capital movements promoted 
competition, resulting in greater efficiency in the production 
of goods and provision of services and providing both greater 
choice and lower prices for consumers. This has now become 
embedded institutionally in the operation of the global 
economy through clauses within multi- and bilateral trade 
agreements that increasingly seek to open up public services, 
from post and telecommunications to health and education, to 
market forces and competition. 
There are two important consequences of this process of 
globalisation and intensified competition. Firstly, as national 
governments agree to be bound by international agreements, 
covering structural adjustment programmes, debt relief 
agreements and trade, the role of the state in the regulation 
of capitalist economies is, voluntarily, weakened. Traditional 
policy responses to protect the economy from market failures 
are increasingly constrained by the powers given to TNCs 
within the international trading system to challenge any 
attempts to protect markets from competition. However, at 
the same time, the notion that a free competitive environment 
has been created also needs to be questioned. In order to 
attract foreign investment, preferential treatment is often 
given to TNCs by host governments, such as the public 
financing of required infrastructure and exemptions from 
legal regulation of environmental protection and wages. At 
the same time, TNCs can usually escape corporation taxes and 
repatriate profits (or relocate these to tax havens). This scope 
for making super profits, along with the structural power that 
the neo-liberal globalisation provides TNCs, creates massive 
incentives for extending business operations across borders and 
sectors. However, underpinning this approach is the narrative 
of competitive pressures, used effectively to emphasise 
the requirement to weaken labour market regulation and, 
crucially its enforcement, as well as reducing the labour costs 
associated with production and service delivery. This potent 
cocktail results in what is frequently referred to as a “race to 
the bottom” (Davies & Vadlamannati, 2013).
The policies of TNC managements, facilitated by the 
development of information and communication technologies 
(ICT) and cheaper and speedier forms of transportation, 
have increasingly been to relocate production and (some) 
services overseas to cheaper production areas, decentralising 
and spatially dispersing the labour process on a global scale 
(Kalleberg, 2009, p. 5). This process, first identified as part of 
a new international division of labour by Frobel et al. (1980, 
p. 9), has intensified as neo-liberal globalisation has advanced, 
and foments the “race to the bottom” as host countries 
compete to attract investment or jobs, reducing labour 
standards, exempting TNCs from existing labour standards or 
“neglecting” to enforce applicable labour regulations. This race 
to the bottom is facilitated by TNCs increasingly subcontracting 
activities down supply chains where contracts for services 
replace direct foreign investment and direct employment 
by the TNC. This is epitomised by the expansion of Export 
Processing Zones in developing market economies, where 
labour standards are frequently not applied (Klein, 2000) and 
which have a “record of facilitating exploitation and making 
a very limited contribution to the overall development of the 
countries in which they are located” (Madeley, 2008, p. 153). 
While relocation (social dumping or offshoring) is frequently 
identified as a key strategy that promotes the race to the 
bottom, distinctive casualisation strategies are also pursued, 
either arm-in-arm with relocation, or separately where, for 
example, the relocation of a service cannot be operationalised, 
notably in the hospitality sector. In this respect, it is important 
to stress that casualisation strategies are not simply a response 
to fluctuations in demand for labour, reflecting the seasonality 
of many sectors, but rather a deliberate attempt, driven by 
TNCs, to remove the direct cost of employment or to reduce 
the “burden” of full-time permanent contracts. The starting 
point for this is the process of sub-contracting as large 
corporations seek to shed their role as direct employers, 
outsourcing work to (small) companies that are meant to 
compete with one another, creating the “fissured workplace” 
(Weil, 2014). The ultimate objective is to erode wages, erode 
employment rights and the costs of workplace regulation to 
secure additional profit. 
In the UK there are three main examples of this process 
of casualisation. In the first instance, employers increasingly 
adopt a core-periphery (dual) labour market within their 
organisations, using employment agencies to supply and 
employ an increasing proportion of the periphery labour market 
to achieve numerical flexibility and cost reductions. Despite 
attempts to regulate this form of work, notably through the EU 
Agency Workers Directive (2011), temporary work continues 
to expand. According to the Office for National Statistics 
(ONS, 2017b), the number of temporary agency workers had 
increased by 14.4% in the three months ending June 2017 
compared with the same period in 2000, while research by the 
Resolution Foundation estimates that there has been a 40% 
increase in agency workers in the last 10 years in the UK, with 
the total number reaching 800 000 (The Independent, 2018). 
Of greater concern have been developments aimed 
at changing the legal status of employment, using 
self-employment. Again, the ONS (2017b) reports that the 
number of self-employed increased by 47.6% in the three 
months ending July 2017 compared with the same period 
in 2000, with the total number of self-employed reaching 
4.8 million (15.1% of the labour force) in 2017. Crucially, 
within those classed as self-employed are a proportion who, 
it is argued, are false (“bogus”) self-employed, where the firm 
disguises employment of their workers as self-employment. 
In these cases, firms establish a contract for services with 
individuals who are subsequently classed as self-employed, 
with the result that they lose entitlement to employment 
rights as employees (or workers) in UK law, notably holiday 
pay, sick pay and the right to the National Minimum Wage 
French26
(NMW), while the employer (and self-employed) may evade 
paying income tax and social insurance contributions. This is 
often achieved through the use of employment intermediaries, 
so called umbrella companies, who encourage the workers to 
become self-employed. Having been used extensively in the 
construction sector, this strategy has been extended to other 
sectors. According to research undertaken by Citizens Advice 
(2015), it is estimated that one in ten people are bogusly 
self-employed, with each of these people losing on average 
£1 288 a year in holiday pay, while the government is losing, 
on average, over £300 in tax revenue for each person who 
is wrongly categorised as self-employed. If scaled up, this 
could mean the government is losing as much as £314 million 
annually. Crucially, Citizens Advice argue that firms which 
seek to do the right thing and employ their staff legitimately 
are placed at a competitive disadvantage by other companies 
which hire bogusly self-employed staff. 
Finally, the UK has also seen the expansion of flexible 
employment contracts, most notoriously the zero-hour contract 
(ZHC), a contract between an employer and a worker where 
the employer is not obliged to provide any minimum working 
hours and the worker is not obliged to accept any work offered 
(ACAS, undated). As ONS (2017b) note, in the three months 
to June 2017, there were 883 000 people employed on 
zero-hour contracts, four times more than in the three months 
to December 2000. While the ZHC contract will usually provide 
the legal status of “worker” rather than self-employed (but not 
employee status) under the law, and thus provide entitlement 
to holiday leave, holiday pay, and the appropriate NMW rate, 
the flexibility provided to employees is significant as hours 
can be met as required without the costs of meeting a fixed 
number of employment hours. Research conducted by the 
Resolution Foundation has highlighted the damaging impact of 
these contracts, where those employed on ZHC receive lower 
gross-weekly pay (an average of £236 per week) and work 
fewer hours on average (21 hours per week) than those who 
are not (31 hours per work). They estimate 8 per cent of all 
workplaces now use zero-hours contracts, with 20 per cent 
of those employed on ZHCs found in health and social work, 
19 per cent in hospitality, 12 per cent in administration, 11 
per cent in retail and 8 per cent in arts, entertainment and 
leisure (Pennycook et al., 2013). Similar forms of flexible hour 
contracts have also been used by employers to contractually 
extend the normal working day of those on contracts with 
specified hours, providing additional hours when required, 
but without incurring fixed costs and avoiding the payment of 
additional overtime premia. 
These examples of casualised working patterns through 
contract manipulation provide scope for employers to gain 
significant numerical flexibility over the utilisation of labour, 
and financial flexibility by removing the direct costs of 
employment or reducing the fixed costs of standard hours 
employment. Further, as noted by Citizens Advice, having been 
used by large TNCs, it becomes harder for other companies 
to avoid casualisation if they are to maintain competitiveness 
while, in turn, there is a growth in companies using these 
contracts to secure profit from the contracts they compete for 
(on price) in the process of sub-contracting.  
A final ingredient of the race to the bottom are migrant 
workers, notably since the eastern enlargement of the 
European Union (EU) and the early decision by the UK 
government to allow A83 nationals unrestricted access to the 
labour market under the EU’s freedom of movement (mobility) 
principle for citizens of member states. Employers have utilised 
A8, and more recently A2, migrants to fill labour market 
shortages or areas of preference mismatch, where there is 
a mismatch between jobs available and the willingness of 
unemployed UK nationals to take on these jobs. Jayaweera 
and Anderson (2008, p. 20) highlight that A8 migrants 
were disproportionately concentrated in low wage and low 
skilled sections of the labour market. They found the largest 
numbers of registrations were as process operatives, followed 
by warehouse operatives, packers, and kitchen and catering 
assistants. In this respect, there was a significant mismatch 
between the education and skills of many A8 migrant workers 
and the work they undertook (Bettin, 2012, p. 59). These 
workers were also disproportionately employed on temporary 
contracts and through employment agencies (MacKenzie 
& Forde, 2009). Finally, the use of A8 migrant workers was 
also associated with lower pay and even the undercutting of 
the NMW. Notwithstanding the limitations of data sources 
in relation to identifying pay rates, Jayaweera and Anderson 
(2008, p. 39) identified that in the period January to September 
2007, 5 655 A8 migrants (3.6%) reported being paid below 
the NMW, and when considered with other data, this leads 
them to argue that
[t]he likelihood of getting paid less than the minimum 
wage was greater for younger migrants, those from 
A8 and A2 countries, those with lower levels of English 
proficiency, women and those in more ‘migrant dense’ 
sectors such as hospitality, agriculture and construction. 
Given that large proportions of migrant workers fall 
into these categories, these patterns reinforce their 
vulnerability in employment (ibid., p. 40). 
Further Pennycook et al. (2013) also note that the employment 
of non-UK nationals is higher among workplaces utilising 
zero-hours contracts (48%) than those who do not (25%). 
It is argued, therefore, that the utilisation of migrant labour 
can be an important element in the casualisation strategies 
employed by firms to reduce labour costs, and while evidence 
suggests that the impact of this additional supply of labour 
to the market has not driven down wages, migrant workers 
have been deployed as part of other strategies to reduce costs, 
especially where due to higher qualification and skill levels, they 
can deliver higher productivity for the same cost (French, 2014).
While citizens of EU member states have, pre-Brexit, 
the right to live and work in the UK, this has not exempted 
them from inclusion in the modern slavery cases identified 
in the introduction to this article. However, the scope for 
forced labour exploitation is greater among non-EU migrants 
whose documented status (visa) in the UK is linked to their 
employment, or those without status or who lose this status and 
are undocumented migrants. Here the UK context is important. 
Since 2010 the now infamous “hostile environment” (The 
Guardian, 2017) was forged by the Coalition government 
through a tightening of immigration pathways into the UK. 
As Portes (2016) notes, these included: a cap on the numbers 
coming through Tier 2 skilled migrants route of 20 700; closure 
of the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme; significant changes 
to the regulation of student migration; and an increase to 
earnings threshold for spouses wishing family reunion. The 
2016 Immigration Act, passed by the current Conservative 
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administration, builds on previous Acts dating back to 1997 in 
providing sanctions on employers who employ undocumented 
workers, but also includes a new criminal offence of illegal 
working which can be applied against workers. Under the 
2016 Act, there have been around 5 000 raids in each of 
the first two years of its application. Between October and 
December 2016, 703 raids were conducted, leading to 974 
workers found working “illegally” and £1.6m penalties 
being issued (McKay, 2018). As Bales (2017) argues, raids 
are frequently targeted at ethnic businesses, such as Indian, 
Bengali or Chinese restaurants or takeaways, and heighten 
the vulnerability of undocumented workers. It is under these 
conditions, where documented status is under threat, that the 
scope for labour exploitation is created.
The UK hospitality sector: meeting the conditions for 
modern slavery
Against this background to the race to the bottom, it is argued 
that the UK hospitality sector is one that is susceptible to 
modern slavery. This is reflected in the structure and geography 
of the sector; its labour intensity and the importance of 
pay costs; weak unionisation and the lack of formal human 
resource management; and comparatively high levels of 
migrant employment. 
The breadth, ownership and workplace structures, and 
geographical spread of the hospitality sector offer some of 
the important pre-conditions for forced labour. Within the 
hotel sector, large TNCs operate hotel chains across the UK 
and beyond, and have increasingly sub-contracted many 
of the services provided within hotels. As Sachdev (cited in 
Armstrong, 2016, pp. 72–73) observes,
[h]otels regularly subcontract recruitment to agencies, 
who in turn may use other recruiters. Often hotel 
management is totally unaware of their staff’s terms 
of employment because their due diligence process 
only extends as far as the first tier of the recruitment 
process, which to them, appears reputable. 
The powerful market position of such TNCs within the 
industry, and their use of subcontracting to reduce costs, 
creates a competitive environment in which other hotels have 
to pursue cost reduction strategies to compete. However, 
the scale and size of the sector overall also contributes to the 
potential scope for poor working practices. As Table 1 shows, 
the sheer breadth of activities and the differentiated size 
and location of workplaces, along with seasonal patterns of 
employment, combine to create a complex and problematic 
sector to regulate.
Crucially, the sector has always been labour intensive, with 
labour costs constituting a significant proportion of total 
costs. Issues around compliance with the NMW can be traced 
back to its introduction in the UK (Gilman et al., 2002). In 
the most recent “name and shame” list produced by the UK 
government in relation to non-compliance with the NMW, 43 
out of the 179 named companies were from the hospitality 
sector, underpaying 5 726 workers a total of £460 459. In 
fact, the three largest underpaying companies came from the 
sector: Wagamama Limited failed to pay £133 212.42 to 2 630 
workers; Marriott Hotels Limited failed to pay £71 722.93 to 
279 workers and TGI Friday’s failed to pay £59 347.64 to 2 302 
workers (BEIS, 2018a). In relation to this, Figure 1, based upon 
ONS (2016) data, compares the low pay in the sector with other 
sectors, noting both the high numbers (almost 60 000) and 
high proportion (4%) of jobs paid below minimum wage levels.
Despite recent attempts, especially in London, by the trade 
union Unite to organise hotels (The Observer, 2015) and by 
Unite and the baker’s union (BAFWU) to organise restaurant 
chains such as TGI Friday’s and McDonalds, the sector has the 
lowest level of union membership, currently at 2.9% (BEIS, 
2018b) and few collective agreements to regulate pay and 
Table 1: Direct employment in the UK hospitality sector 2010–2014
2010 
(thousands)
2014 
(thousands)
2010 
(%)
2014 
(%)
Net change 2010–2014 
(thousands)
Hotel and related 420 512 16 18 92
Hotels and similar accommodation 318 382 2 2 13
Holiday and other short-stay accommodation 46 59 2 2 13
Camping grounds, recreational vehicle parks and trailer parks 33 42 1 1 9
Other accommodation 8 9 0 0 2
Temporary agency employment (estimate) 16 20 1 1 4
Restaurant and related 1 320 1 493 51 51 173
Licensed and unlicensed restaurants and cafes 573 731 22 25 158
Takeaway food shops 153 199 6 7 46
Licensed clubs 111 93 4 3 −19
Public houses and bars 432 411 17 14 −21
Temporary agency employment (estimate) 51 60 2 2 8
Catering 825 887 32 30 62
Event catering activities 232 139 9 5 −93
Other food service activities 23 129 1 4 106
In-house catering 470 505 18 17 36
Temporary agency employment (estimate) 100 113 4 4 13
Event management 23 28 1 1 4
Convention and trade show organisers 22 27 1 1 4
Temporary agency employment (estimate) 1 1 0 0 0
Hospitality total 2 588 2 919 100 100 331
Source: Oxford Economics (2015, p. 15)
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conditions. At the same time, many authors identify a lack 
of sophisticated HR management in the sector (e.g. Head 
& Lucas, 2004). This provides plenty of scope for employers 
to use casualisation strategies to secure further labour cost 
savings, with Warhurst et al. (2008) identifying, among 
cleaning attendants in mid-market budget hotels in the south, 
the use of temporary agency workers and a piece rate pay 
system, where pay was based on a rate per room cleaned. If 
occupancy rates were low (reducing the number of rooms to 
be cleaned) or if targets of rooms per hour were set too high, 
so that rooms took longer to clean than the time prescribed 
by management, the cleaning assistants could be paid lower 
than the NMW. The ONS (2017a) also reports that the sector 
has the highest level (22%) of employment on zero-hour 
contracts (ZHCs). Leading figures in the hospitality industry 
have stressed how such contracts are vitally important to the 
industry, emphasising significant seasonal and event-based 
fluctuations in demand, and how the flexibility is required to 
allow the sector to continue growing. However, the arguments 
that these are both necessary and that workers want such 
flexibility themselves is less convincing, given the relative 
success of Unite in mobilising around the end of ZHCs in the 
London hotel sector, and the successful campaign by the union 
to end ZHCs for 5 000 staff working for leading hospitality and 
housekeeping firm, WGC, which employs housekeepers, room 
attendants and porters in hotels across the UK (ETI, 2017).
Finally, the sector has the highest concentrations of migrant 
workers in the UK. Based upon analysis of the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS), People 1st (2016) estimate that 24% of the 
hospitality and tourism sectors’ workforce are migrant workers, 
with 45% of these being EU nationals and 55% coming from 
outside the EU. Table 2 provides an overview of the utilisation 
of migrant workers across the sector by different hospitality 
occupations based on their analysis. It highlights the significant 
migrant employment among chefs, housekeepers, restaurant 
and catering managers and proprietors, cooks, kitchen 
assistants, waiting staff and other elementary occupations in 
the industry. In addition to this analysis, KMPG (2017) have 
argued that LFS data underestimate the number of migrant 
workers in the hospitality sector and they estimate that EU 
nationals (alone) may constitute as much as 23.7% of the 
workforce.
As argued above, the significant employment of migrant 
workers in the sector, particularly those from outside the EU 
where documented status can easily be threatened, provides 
scope for greater flexibility and cost reductions and has, in 
turn, created conditions for potential modern slavery cases in 
the sector. As the CORE Coalition (2017, p. 51) note in relation 
to hotels and accommodation: 
Much of the workforce recruited into the industry 
by agencies is made up of migrant workers who are 
vulnerable to exploitation in both recruitment and 
employment practices. Lack of knowledge about 
employment rights, limited language skills and little 
or no access to training and support networks can 
place migrant workers at particular risk of abuse. Debt 
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Figure 1: Jobs paid below the minimum wage by low-paid industry groups in the UK, April 2016 (Source: Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, 
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bondage arising from excessive recruitment fees, debt 
servicing and wage deductions can entrap migrant 
workers within circles of abuse. These factors mean 
that migrants, along with other vulnerable workers, 
frequently lack the leverage or knowledge that would 
allow them to assert their basic rights.
This quote is taken from research conducted by the CORE 
Coalition (2017) which examined how companies in high-risk 
sectors were addressing modern slavery risks in their Slavery and 
Human Trafficking Statements, which they had to produce by 
30 September 2017 to comply with the 2015 Modern Slavery 
Act. Examining the statements of the Hilton, Intercontinental 
(IHG), Hyatt and Marriot hotels, it noted that they
provide only vague information on how franchisees’ 
adherence to human rights standards is ensured. IHG 
is the only company to provide details on identified 
risks, while the other companies simply report that 
they have conducted human rights impact assessments 
or risk assessments, without disclosing the findings 
(CORE Coalition, 2017, pp. 51–52). 
Given the dominant neo-liberal perspective within UK business 
community, it is perhaps not surprising that the overall 
conclusion to the research across sectors was that
[i]n general, we find that many of these statements 
are not compliant with the basic requirements of the 
legislation and that the majority do not address in 
substantive detail the six topic areas listed in the Act…
Many companies are not reporting on human rights 
due diligence and are not considering how their own 
business models can create risks of severe labour rights 
abuses (ibid., p. 8).
The shadow of Brexit and the road to modern slavery?
While it is still impossible to predict the outcome of Brexit, 
the process may produce conditions in which modern slavery 
could thrive. In its report for the British Hospitality Association 
over Brexit, KPMG (2017) highlight the potential problems in 
supply labour to the sector if EU migrants are no longer able to 
migrate to the UK. They report that the sector has the highest 
number of vacancies as a share of its total employment and 
the number of vacancies has grown by 79% in the last five 
years. At the same time, low unemployment rates in the UK 
mean there would be an insufficient supply of UK-born labour 
to fill the recruitment needs of the sector if the supply of EU 
migrants were to be cut off.
Yet, as Clarke (2016) argues, it is probable that the 
post-Brexit immigration regime, if it were to follow the hostile 
environment approach adopted by the UK government 
since 2010, will focus primarily upon offering documented 
employment to (highly) skilled workers. If the routes to securing 
documented migrants in the sector are curtailed or significantly 
reduced, then the labour supply issue will be acute, other than 
ending service provision (companies closing), there is limited 
scope in such a labour-intensive industry to substitute labour 
through automation or off-shoring. 
These political and economic developments could, therefore, 
create conditions for modern slavery with the trafficking of 
vulnerable undocumented workers to work in the sector. It is 
also the case that Brexit could reduce the scope for modern 
slavery to be monitored and tackled. In a report by the 
Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group (ATMG), a coalition of 
thirteen UK anti-trafficking organisations that monitors the UK’s 
progress in the fight against modern slavery, it is argued that
[t]he UK Government’s stated intention is to end 
the free movement of labour and introduce new 
immigration legislation to control and curb immigration 
Table 2: The utilisation of migrant workers across hospitality occupations (2011 to 2015)
Occupation
2011 2015 Difference in 
migrant workers 
between 
2011 and 2015
(n)
Migrant 
workers
(n)
Migrant 
workers in 
occupation
%
Migrant 
workers from 
EU countries
%
Migrant 
workers
(n)
Migrant  
workers in 
occupation
%
Migrant 
workers from 
EU countries
%
Hotel and accommodation managers and 
proprietors
7 528 19 3 4 138 9 1 −3 390
Restaurant and catering establishment 
managers and proprietors
47 196 43 15 41 647 35 7 −5 549
Publicans and managers of licensed 
premises
3 590 8 2 3 676 8 1 86
Conference and exhibition managers and 
organisers
3 794 18 2 4 400 14 2 606
Chefs 53 439 37 15 81 484 42 18 28 045
Cooks 14 525 38 3 14 179 31 2 −346
Catering and bar managers 6 685 15 1 7 038 15 3 353
Leisure and travel service occupations 517 6 0.5 843 9 0 326
Housekeepers and related occupations 2 385 25 2 2 177 35 1 −208
Kitchen and catering assistants 68 209 27 18 85 481 29 27 17 272
Waiting staff 63 776 28 29 73 159 29 24 9 383
Bar staff 14 908 8 8 23 734 13 11 8 826
Leisure and theme park attendants 0 0 0 164 1 0 164
Other elementary service occupations 1 741 12 1 5 613 35 2 3 872
Source: People 1st (2016)
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to the UK. The risk post-Brexit is the introduction of 
overly restrictive immigration policies which increase 
the vulnerability of migrant workers to exploitation, as 
exemplified in the case of Overseas Domestic Workers. 
These risks are exacerbated when coupled with a 
labour market that favours deregulation and flexibility; 
in practice, this has resulted in an erosion of workers’ 
rights (ATMG, 2017, p. 2).
Two further potentially negative developments are also 
identified in the report. First, that attempts to weaken or 
remove EU employment law directives (for example over 
working time) will weaken the regulatory scope to identify and 
tackle modern slavery. Second, it is argued that if relationships 
with EU bodies are not maintained post-Brexit, then not only 
will funding streams which provide important resources for 
those tackling modern slavery be lost, but the UK could exclude 
itself from EU-level networks co-ordinating anti-trafficking 
activity, such as the EU Civil Society Platform against Trafficking 
in Human Beings (ibid., pp. 2–3).
Conclusion
This paper has argued that neo-liberal globalisation has created 
an economic environment that promotes deregulation and the 
weakening of the role of the state in regulating a national 
economy. The perceived benefits of competition have been 
used to create a political and economic framework in which the 
promise of choice and cheaper consumer goods and services 
has been used to justify strategies to reduce operational costs 
and promote super profits. This has led to the development 
of casualisation strategies, supported by weak labour market 
regulation, that provide employers with increasing numerical, 
temporal and pay flexibility. The UK is a prime example of such 
a neo-liberal state, with the growth of agency working, (bogus) 
self-employment and ZHCs, and one which had supported the 
EU’s freedom of movement, and immigration from outside of 
the EU, to secure a supply of migrant workers to fit into this 
fragmented and deregulated labour market. 
The UK hospitality sector, while exhibiting the largest 
rates of growth, demonstrates many of the characteristics 
of casualisation strategies. These labour market conditions, 
based upon exploitative practices to reduce labour costs, 
are also argued to facilitate pathways into modern slavery, 
where exploitative labour is involuntary. Again, as a sector 
that has followed deregulatory and exploitative labour market 
practices, there is scope for these developments to occur within 
hospitality. Indeed, the economic and political framework that 
may emerge from Brexit is likely to exacerbate the conditions 
upon which modern slavery can thrive.
While such a prognosis is depressing, it should be noted that 
there is scope to challenge trafficking and modern slavery. The 
Modern Slavery Act in England, and Wales and its counterparts 
in Northern Ireland and Scotland, do provide an important legal 
framework. Regulatory state-supported bodies, such as the 
Health and Safety Executive, Gangmasters’ Licensing Agency, 
Equality and Human Rights Commission and Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs (HMRC) do have powers to investigate 
workplaces and tackle modern slavery practices. However, 
enforcement through such agencies is increasingly problematic 
as government austerity policies cut funding to these bodies. 
And the danger is that, post-Brexit, when the UK has the 
“opportunity” to escape from aspects of regulation provided 
by EU Directives, this minimalist, deregulatory position will be 
reinforced, and modern slavery practices, in high risk sectors 
such as hospitality, will thrive.
Notes
1. National Referral Mechanism (NRM) is a framework for identifying 
and referring potential victims of modern slavery and ensuring they 
receive the appropriate support. Under the Modern Slavery Act, 
only designated first responders can refer cases to the NRM. The Act 
also creates the duty to notify, where specified public authorities 
are required to notify the Home Office about any potential victims 
of modern slavery they encounter in England and Wales. However, 
if the potential victim does not want to be referred using the NRM 
system, then a separate anonymous notification is made. This 
creates two sets of data, which may contain duplicated cases.
2. The European Economic Area (EEA) includes EU countries and 
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. The latter countries are, under 
this arrangement, part of the EU single market and freedom of 
movement arrangements apply to them.
3. An A8 migrant refers to a citizen of the following eight countries 
that joined the EU in May 2004: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. These were 
identified separately from citizens of Malta and Cyprus, who joined 
at the same time. An A2 migrant refers to a citizen of Bulgaria and 
Romania that joined the EU in January 2007. Unlike A8 countries, 
the UK imposed restrictions on the access to labour markets of A2 
citizens in 2007 which were lifted in January 2014.
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